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RECONSIDERING INSURANCE FOR
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

TOM BAKER*

I. INTRODUCTION

Many courts refuse on policy grounds to enforce contracts to provide
insurance for punitive damages, to the general applause of academic
conunentary . 1 According to the conventional wisdom, insurance for
punitive damages defeats the purposes of those damages and therefore
courts should prohibit that insurance . This Article reexamines the
conventional wisdom in light of basic information about the liability
insurance market and concludes that there is little evidence of a need for
this particular form of judicial regulation.
The next two parts of this Article set the scene for the main
discussion in Part IV. Part II reviews the deterrence and retribution
objections to insurance for punitive damages . Part III then describes
restrictions that insurance companies have placed on the insurance they
offer for punitive damages and explains those restrictions as efforts to
control moral hazard and adverse selection .
Part IV considers the case for judicial regulation of punitive damages
insurance in light of these market restrictions . Part IV argues that the
twin problems of moral hazard and adverse selection provide insurance
companies with adequate incentive to address the deterrence objection to
punitive damages insurance and that the companies' control over
underwriting and contracting places them in a better position than courts
to address that objection. Therefore, there is no need for courts to act on
deterrence grounds to prohibit insurance for punitive damages .
The incentives of insurance companies do not mesh as neatly with
the retributive obj ectives of tort law . Accordingly , retribution provides
a somewhat stronger case for judicial regulation of punitive damages
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insurance (as well as other aspects of liability insurance) . Nevertheless ,
even with punitive damages insurance , tort law i n action will calibrate the
sting of a tort action according to the culpability of the defendant, and
insurance underwriting practices reduce the ability of repeat offenders to
use insurance to insulate themselves from the retributive aims of tort law .
Moreover, because there is nothing a court can do to stop an insurance
company from paying a punitive damages claim, particularly at the
settlement stage, there is little reason to believe that judicial regulation of
punitive damages insurance will have a significant impact on the
retributive function of tort law . Thus, even the retribution-based case for
implying a punitive damages exclusion in liability insurance policies is at
best a weak one . 2
Part V addresses the implications of this analysis for tort and
insurance policy . As this Article illustrates , a primary function of
insurance institutions is constructing insurance relationships that minimize
the insurance-deterrence tradeoff predicted by economic theory . 3 Thus,
when discussing " insurance" in the context of tort policy , we have to be
careful to distinguish between theoretical conceptions of insurance and
insurance as it is actually provided through insurance institutions . 4
Similarly, when discussing insurance policy , we cannot forget that
insurance institutions play an important role in furthering the obj ectives
of tort policy.
This Article illustrates the point most concretely by using the
existence of intentional harm exclusions as the primary basis for the
In reaching this conclusion, I do not consider the claim by some courts that

2.

insurance for punitive damages should be permitted on the grounds that punitive damages
do not serve their intended function.

See Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co.,

383 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tenn. 1964). I agree with Dean Ellis that if these courts are right, the
better approach is to address punitive damages directly.

See Ellis, supra note 1, at 75.

See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Risk, Incentives and Insurance: The Pure Theory of

3.

Moral Hazard, 8 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 4, 6 (1983) ("[T]he more and better

insurance that is provided against some contingency, the less incentive individuals have

to avoid the insured event, because the less they bear the full consequences of their
actions.").
4.

A nice example of the importance of paying attention to this distinction

appears in Jon D. Hanson and Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An

Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability,

76 CORNELL L. REV.

129 ( 1990)

(criticizing tort theorists for failing to consider t.t'1e fact that first party insurance for
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conclusion that there is little to gain by prohibiting insurance for punitive
damages. Because of intentional harm exclusions , the liability insurance
that is actually provided through the insurance market poses much less an
insurance-deterrence tradeoff than the simple model of insurance that is
employed in most economic theory .5 Furthermore, the significance of
these exclusions to that tradeoff means that insurance c0mpanies that
(properly) deny claims on intentional harm grounds serve important
deterrence and retribution functions that further the obj ectives of tort law .
II.

A

THEORETIC AL PERS PECTIVE O N INSURANCE FOR
PUNITIVE DMIAGES

It is well established in the theoretical literature that there are two
primary justifications for punitive damages : retribution and prevention.6
As Ellis has shown, the remaining justifications , such as compensation or
legitimation, depend on theories of retribution or prevention to explain
why punitive damages should be assessed in one case but not another .7
It is commonly observed that insurance for punitive damages defeats
the purposes of those damages . 8 If we understand retribution to require

5.

See, e . g., Stiglitz, supra note 3. This is not a criticism of economic theory,

but rather a call for careful application of that theory in the context of insurance
institutions.

See Chandler, Visualizing, supra note 4 for a formal demonstration, using

computer-assisted mathematical modeling, of the theoretical ability of insurance contract
provisions to reduce the insurance-deterrence tradeoff.

6.

See Ellis, supra note 1 (Following the conventions of law and economics

scholarship, Ellis uses the term "deterrence," rather than "prevention.").
7.

See id. at 10-12.

For example, the fact that punitive damages serve to

compensate plaintiffs for otherwise non-compensable harm does not tell us which plaintiffs
are entitled to those additional damages. We need notions of retribution or deterrence to
explain why providing greater than the usual compensatory damages is best in one case
and not another. We accept less than complete compensation generally, perhaps because
we are uncomfortable with requiring negligent or strictly liable defendants to bear the
entire cost of their injury causing activity, or because we want to encourage people to
"lump it" to some degree in order to discourage claiming. But, when a defendant behaves
in a sufficiently flagrant fashion, we are less uncomfortable with requiring that defendant
to bear the full costs (or more) of his or her conduct and we
plaintiff should "lump it."

no

longer believe that the

If we explore why our feelings are different fOi the

flagrant

defendant, we wili see that t.'J.e reasons track those that will be discussed in the paragraphs

on retribution and deterrence below.

See infra

Parts II.C-D.

Ellis did not address directly the legitimation purpose of punitive damages: for
example, convincing us that tort law is in fact
powerful economic actors.

legitimation may well be the
purpose cannot tell

8.
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inciuding such populous states as
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well:
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the deprivation of something that the offender values, then the tension
between punitive damages and insurance is obvious. A money judgment
hardly stings the defendant when it is an insurance company that pays .
S imilarly, if we understand prevention to require imposition of the cost
of harm on the offending party, the tension between insurance and
punitive damages is equally obvious .
The higher, and perhaps
prohibitive, price that the offender must pay to purchase insurance in the
future pales in comparison to the punitive damages judgment thereby
avoided.
The standard theoretical analysis criticizes insurance for
punitive damages on just these grounds.9 While I do not entirely dispute
this analysis , the theoretical case against enforcing contracts to msure
punitive damages is not as strong as commonly understood .
A.

Punitive Damages as Prevention

" Prevention" is a term that I have borrowed from Professors
Galanter and Luban in place of the more commonly used term
" deterrence . "10 By using "prevention, " Galanter and Luban intend to
capture , not only the idea that punitive damages can prevent loss by
subj ecting people to severe financial consequences for causing loss , but
also the idea that punitive damages can prevent loss by making a strong
statement that certain conduct lies well outside the bounds of the
acceptable.11 I prefer Galanter and Luban's "prevention" because it
helps to remind me (and may help remind others) of this norm projection
function of punishment, which has not been emphasized in the economic
analysis of law . 12 As Galanter and Luban recognize, human behavior
insurance of direct punitive damages on public policy grounds. Ail states permit the
insurance of punitive damages that are assessed vicariously. See id.
9.
See, e.g. , Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S.
CAL. L. REV. 79, 96 (1982) (arguing that this criticism should give way because

insurance makes both victims and tortfeasors better oft); Ellis, supra note 1, at 73-76.
While I agree with the conclusion that punitive damages insurance should not be
prohibited, I disagree strongly with Cooter's reasoning because it takes an ex post
approach to victim welfare that fails to acknowledge victims' autonomy . For a critique
of ex post approaches to victim welfare, see Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and
Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary
Injuries, 83 CAL. L. R EV 773 (1995).
.

10.

See Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and

Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U . L . REV. 1393, 1429 (1993).
11.

Cf.

David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems

and Reform, 39 VILL. L. R E V . 363,

374 (1994) (referring to

the "education" function of

punitive damages).

12.
I do not want to suggest, however, that this function cannot be accommodated
within the concept of deterrence as it is used in economic analysis . From an economic
perspective, Galanter and Luban are simply highlighting the fact that people have

l
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is strongly conformist. In most situations , we decide on the appropriate
level of care, not by making an explicit cost-benefit calculation, but rather
by observing whether there is a rule or norm that applies to a given
situation. 13 If so, we typically orient our behavior to that rule or norm.
One way punitive damages awards prevent harm is by reminding people
that norms of safety or care exist and stigmatizing flagrant violation of
them.
Whether we focus on the financial or norm projection aspects of
punitive damages , however, the difficult theoretical question is why we
need punitive damages to prevent harm, when compensatory damage
awards already project norms and create financial incentives for
conforming to those norms . Why, in other words , punish defendants to
prevent harm when we already attempt to compensate plaintiffs at the
level that is (at least theoretically) appropriate for preventing harm?
Ellis has explained that punitive damages are an efficient complement
to compensatory damages in three situations:
(1) When the probability of being held liable for breach of a
legal standard is less than the probability of loss resulting
from that breach;
(2) When there are important harms that would not be
considered in computing a compensatory damage award;
and
(3) When the actor derives an illegitimate benefit from the
harmful act. 1 4

preferences for things other than money . Fining Bob for doing X will affect the behavior
of Alice, a rational conformist, not simply because she wants to avoid the fine imposed
on Bob, but also because she values living her life in a socially acceptable way . In other

words, she is deterred from doing X, not only by the probabilistic costs anributable to the
risk of being fined, but also because of the value she places on living in a socially
responsible manner (and the corollary of that value, the loss to her self-understanding
anributable to engaging in stigmatized behavior-a loss that will occur whether or not she
is caught).
13.
It is possible that the norm or rule will itself be the result of a cost-b enefit
analysis. To the extent individuals make a cost-benefit calculation, however, the costs and
benefits are assessed, not with reference to the probability of loss that may be imposed
on others (Learned Hand's BPL, see United States v . Carroll Towing Co . , 1 59 F .2d 1 6 9 ,
1 73 (2d C i r . 1 947)) , but with reference to what there is t o gain or lose b y breaching the
applicable norm.
14.
See Ellis, supra note 1, at 2 5-3 3 .
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The first situation results from what I will call the "underenforcement"
problem; the second situation results from what I will call the
" externalities" problem; and the third situation, from what I will call the
" deviance" problem.
While these categories may be criticized as
overbroad, 15 they provide a helpful framework for discussing whether
punitive damages insurance is consistent with the prevention justification
for punitive damages .
1.

UNDERENFORCEMENT AND EXTERNAL IT IES

The underenforcement and externalities problems are alike in that
they highlight the failure of the compensatory damages regime to impose
the full costs of harm on those who are liable for causing that harm. The
underenforcement problem means that some people who should be held
responsible for causing harm are not. The externalities problem means
that those who are held responsible are not required to compensate all
those harmed for all the harm suffered . Both problems threaten the
prevention function of the legal regime .
Negligence regimes can in theory withstand substantial
uncompensated harm with no loss in their deterrent effect . 16
Nevertheless, there is a tipping point below which it would be rational for
the actor to ignore the legal standard .17 Punitive damages can move that
tipping point downward, compensating for underenforcement and
undercompensation. We know from empirical research that the U.S.
legal system is characterized by massive underenforcement and substantial
undercompensation . 18 Were damages limited to compensation, a rational
actor who was not constrained by the conscience, stigma, or good will
costs that typically accompany the violation of social norms would often
be better off ignoring legal standards governing caretaking conduct .
Punitive damages assessed when a defendant deliberately ignores a legal
standard can discourage actors from deliberately taking advantage of the
underenforcement and externalities problems .

15.
See David G. Owen, Civil Punishment and the Public Good, 56 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1 0 3 , 1 1 3 ( 1 982) ("each of Professor Ellis' categories seems all-inclusive or almost
so: none of the categories appear to exclude many, if any, cases.").
See Cooter, supra note 9 , a t 80-8 1 .
16.
See id.
Using the numbers provided i n Cooter's exploding pop bottle
17.
hypothetical, I was able to calculate a "tipping point" that occurs when the bottler is held
liable for thirty percent or less of the costs of exploding pop b o ttle s.
1 8.
See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the

PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992) (an exhaustive
review of the empirical literature and findings in the tort field).

Ton Litigation System-And �'hy Not?, 140 U.

1 998 : 10 1
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In theory , strict liability regimes are much more sensitive to
underenforcement and undercompensation problems than negligence
regimes . 19 Indeed, as Cooter has shown, any reduction in enforcement
or compensation will result in reduced care . 20 Although this analysis
can be understood as a reason for preferring negligence to strict liability ,
it also provides a theoretical justification for the use of punitive damages
within a strict liability regime . Given that we know that only a fraction
of injured individuals makes claims , we can confidently say that all real
world strict liability regimes will be characterized by underenforcement.
Within a strict liability regime, punitive damages could create the same
threshold effect as the negligence standard,21 thereby increasing the level
of safety under strict liability . Thus , rather than being incoherent,22 the
imposition of punitive damages in an appropriate strict liability case may
serve a useful prevention function .
2.

DEVIANCE

The " deviance" problem arises from the actor who is unable or
unwilling to act in accordance with the values that are recognized as
legitimate by the prevailing legal regime . Ellis uses as his example a man
who engages in violence because of the infidelity of his spouse.
Compensatory damages are not an adequate deterrent in Ellis ' s example
because the husband derives satisfaction from inflicting injury on the
spouse or her sexual partner . Other examples of the deviance problem
include violence by members of groups committed to an alternative social
order. At least formally, the satisfaction that results from self-help
violence is not recognized as legitimate in the U.S. legal regime,23 and
punitive damages are one way to make that point.

19.
See Cooter, supra note 9, at 91. For an analysis that suggests that this
difference between negligence and strict liabiliry disappears when insurance companies
specifY precaution conditions, see Chandler, Understanding, supra note 4, at 138-40.
See Cooter, supra note 9, at 91.
20.
An alternative , and more practically important threshold, is provided by
21.
insurance contract provisions that specifY the precautions that insureds must take to avoid
harm. See generally Chandler, Understanding, supra note 4; Chandler, Visualizing, supra
note 4. The intentional harm and accident provisions discussed in Part III of this paper
are two examples of s uch provisions.
2 2.
See, e.g . , Ellen Wertheimer, Punitive Danzages and Strict Products Liability:
An Esso.y in Oxymoron, 39 VILL. L. REV. 5 05 (1994).
23.
The reluctance of some legal authorities to police domestic violence could well
lead one to conclude that the "law in action" does not regard such violence as entirely
illegitimate. See RICHARD J. GELLES & MURRAY A. STRAUSS, INTIMATE VIOLENCE 2025 ( 1 9 88).

1 08
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While it seems unlikely that the threat of a punitive damages
judgment will do much to prevent such harm, an actual punitive damages
judgment may at least partially incapacitate organized groups in conflict
with the existing social order. The punitive damages judgments obtained
by the Southern Poverty Law Center against the Klu Klux Klan and other
white supremacists represent one attempt to use punitive damages for this
specific deterrence purpose . 24

B. Considering Punitive Damages Insurance in Light of the
Prevention Justification
Like the uncompensated harm that results from underenforcement and
externalities , l iability insurance lowers the cost of violating a legal
standard. Accordingly , liability insurance is subject to the same tipping
point analysis.25 In theory , the incentive effects of insurance and
uncompensated harm are additive.
Thus, given the problems of
underenforcement and externalities , one might wonder how much
deterrence insured damages really provide.26
For compensatory
damages, this insurance-deterrence tradeoff7 is widely tolerated . Thus ,
the theoretical possibility of the tradeoff cannot itself be a serious
obj ection to punitive damages . What might be different about punitive
damages?
One answer turns on the theoretical purposes of compensatory and
punitive damages: both compensatory and punitive damages are intended
to prevent harm, but only compensatory damages are intended to provide
compensation for victims, and only punitive damages are intended to
provide retribution. In light of this distinction, we could say that the
insurance-deterrence tradeoff is tolerated for compensatory damages
because insurance for compensatory damages enhances tort law ' s
compensation function without undercutting its retribution function .
Insurance for punitive damages , on the other hand , appears to undercut
tort law ' s retribution function without providing any necessary benefit in
terms of compensation.28
24.
See Morris Dees, Finding the Forum for a Victory, NAT'L L . J . , Feb . 11, 1991
at 53 (describing the Southern Law Poverty Center's strategy of bankrupting white
supremacists) .
25.
See Chandler, Visualizing, supra note 4 , a t 123 (us ing computer-assisted
modeling to estimate a tipping point that occurs, in the absence of precaution conditions
in the insurance contract, at an indemnification level of twenty percent).
26.
See Gary T. Schwartz , Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does
Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. R EV. 377 (1994).
See Stiglitz, supra note 3.
27 .
See text accompanying notes 42-45 (discussing insurance and retribution).
28.

I
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Punitive damages also differ from compensatory damages in a
manner more directly related to the prevention rationale . Recall Galanter
and Luban' s observation that tort damages prevent harm, not only through
financial incentives , but also through norm projection. Clearly, insurance
reduces the financial incentives created by tort damages; this is so for
both compensatory and punitive damages . Insurance does not undercut
so fundamentally, however, the norm projection aspect of tort damages.
Indeed, insurance may improve the norm projection aspect of tort law :
the existence o f insurance makes i t more likely that damage awards will
be paid, thereby increasing the ability of plaintiffs to vindicate their rights
through tort law . Moreover, the existence o f insurance institutions
facilitates the dissemination of the norms created and reflected in tort
law . 29
Nevertheless, it seems likely that norm projection will have less
effect on behavior that meets the standard for punitive damages awards
than on behavior that does not meet that standard . Defendants who are
liable for punitive damages are more likely to have known that their
conduct violated (or was likely to violate) the relevant standard of care
than defendants who are not held liable .30 Those who are willing to
violate a legal standard are unlikely to be deterred from violating it again
Indeed, given the
simply by being reminded of the standard .
underenforcement and externalities problems discussed above, a rational
actor may be better off ignoring legal standards governing caretaking
conduct . Punitive damages can change this conscious cost-benefit calculus
only if the actor expects to bear the costs of those damages .
Insurance for compensatory damages does not undercut the
prevention rationale of tort damages to the same extent, because those
who violate legal standards inadvertently are governed more by tort law ' s
norm projection function than those who violate legal standards
deliberately . 31 As this suggests , the lower the level of intent required
for punitive damages, the weaker the prevention-based objection to
insurance for those damages. Thus, it is not surprising that U.S. courts

29.
Indeed, as Kent Syverud has suggested, at times insurance institutions can
anticipate legal norms . See Kent D. Syverud, On the Demandfor Liability Insurance, 72
TEX. L. REV. 1 629, 1 63 8 n.33 ( 1 994).
30.
Note that this is a probabilistic statement; not an assertion that all those
subjected to an award will have this level of intent. Unless we deny that the standard for
punitive damages has anything to do with intent (or that fact finders are more often right
than wrong), this probabilistic statement will be true regardless of the precise standard for
punitive damages. For a listing of various standards employed by courts , see Michael
Rustad & Tho mas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards:
Reforming the Tort Refomzers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1 269, 1 3 17 n.240 (1993).
Cf. Cooter, supra note 9 , at 85 -86 (suggesting that the i mprecision of legal
31.
standards explains much of the inadvertent violation of those standards) .
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universally enforce contracts to provide insurance for vicarious punitive
damages . 32 Vicarious punitive damages are assessed against a principal
who was merely negligent in the supervision of her agent. 33 For that
reason, the insurance-deterrence tradeoff for vicarious punitive damages
should be similar to that for compensatory damages . Moreover, insuring
vicarious punitive damages enhances the norm proj ection aspects of tort
law by providing an incentive for plaintiffs and their lawyers to bring to
public attention flagrant breaches of legal standards . 34
C.

Punitive Damages as Retribution

Using work by the philosopher Jean Hampton, Galanter and Luban
have offered a strong retribution-based defense of punitive damages. 35
Following Hampton, they explain that the purpose of retribution is to
express "public commitment to the value of persons. "36 A public
commitment to the value of persons requires a public response when a
person acts deliberately to cause harm (or in a way known to have a very
high probability of causing harm) , because that person has denied the
value of those he has harmed . In effect, his actions say to his victims ,
"You are worth so much less than I that I can hurt you deliberately . "
A s Galanter and Luban explain, the retributive purpose of punitive
damages "is to reassert the truth about the relative value of wrongdoer
and victim by intlicting a publicly visible defeat on the wrongdoer. "37
For this reason, they describe punitive damages awards as a form of
"expressive defeat. "38
Yet, compensatory damage awards also can be understood as a form
of expressive defeat. After all , the victim wins the lawsuit and the
perpetrator is required to pay the victim for the harm caused . Thus, as
See Widiss, supra note 1, at 482.
32.
See, e.g., 2 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS§
33.
8:50 (1985) (describing standards for the imposition of vicarious punitive damages, some
of which require a considerably lower level of fault than negligence). Absent v icarious
liability for punitive damages, principals would have an incentive not to monitor their
agents' behavior so as not to have the knowledge necessary to support a direct punitive
damages award.
34.
For an argument that the deterrent purposes of punitive damages is satisfied
by compensating only the lawyer (and not the plaintiff), see Note, An Economic Analysis
of the Plaintifl's Windfall from Punitive Damage Litigation, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1900
(1992). This argument ignores the conflicts of interest between piaintiffs and their
lawyers that would result from compensating lawyers but not �heir clients.
See Ga!anter & Luban. supra note 1 0, at 1432.
35.
36.
Jd. at 1434.
37.
!d. at 1432.

38.

!d. (internal quotations omitted).
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with prevention, one might reasonably ask why we need punitive damages
for retribution, when we already compensate in a manner that appears to
serve this retributive purpose? The answer must be that the relative value
that would be asserted in a legal regime that limited damages to
compensation would be false.
There are (at least) two reasons why the relative values would be
false . The first dovetails with Ellis's deterrence justifications for punitive
damages . The second follows from the relatively low level of moral
culpability that is required for compensatory damages .
First , as the underenforcement and externalities problems reveal,
perpetrators as a class wrongfully cause more harm to victims than they
are required to pay as compensation. The presence of this substantial
uncompensated harm defeats the compensatory damages regime's claim
to an efficient result (i . e . , one in which the benefits to society of an
activity that causes harm exceed its costs) . Moreover, as the deviance
problem reveals , damages that are based solely on compensation can
encourage the use of harm to achieve improper ends . For both these
reasons, a legal regime that limited damages to compensation would
systematically privilege perpetrators over victims and would encourage
perpetrators to treat victims as means to achieve ends that are illegitimate
within the logic of the legal regime .
Second, compensatory damage awards do not adequately satisfy the
moral requirement that the consequences of action turn on moral
culpability . Think of the distinction that young children learn between
hurting someone "by accident" and hurting someone "on purpose . " The
higher level consequence given to children for hurting someone "on
purpose" represents an effort to teach them about the value of persons
and-this is the crucial point-the role that distinctions made on the basis
of the actor's state of mind play in maintaining that value .
For good reasons , compensatory damages are assessed for much
harm that is caused "by accident" and are not, as a formal matter,
computed on the basis of moral culpability (beyond the requirement that
the threshold liability standard is met) . 39 Yet, public commitment to the
morally appropriate value of persons requires that there be greater
consequences for harm that is done "on purpose .
I do not mean to
suggest that the formulations used with children are adequate to describe
the distinctions that tort law does or should make, but the point should be
clear. In tort law, compensatory damages are assessed when harm results
from an act of reiatively low moral culpability . When the perpetrator's
"

39.

See,

e.g., JULES L.

COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS

2 1 8 - 1 9 (1992). As I will

discuss in Part IV, tort law in action recognizes additional gradations in culpability,
mainly because of insurance.
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moral culpability significantly exceeds that level , there must be some
additional consequence, or else tort law has failed to "right the
wrong . "40 Thus, without punitive damages (or some other additional
consequence) , tort law fails, because the "wrong " is a function, not only
of the harm caused, but also of the moral culpability of the person who
caused it. 41

D. Punitive Damages Insurance and Retribution
Punitive damages can be justified on retributive grounds, then,
because the relative value of persons asserted by compensatory damages
is, in the sense described above , false . It is false because compensatory
damages allow perpetrators to cause harm to achieve illegitimate ends .
And it is also false because compensatory damages , alone, cannot right
the wrong caused by perpetrators whose moral culpability significantly
exceeds the compensatory damages threshold.
Does insurance for punitive damages undercut these retributive
justifications? The quick answer is "of course . " If by retribution we
mean hurting the perpetrator , how can money paid by an insurance
company "right the wrong"? Although the insurance company may raise
rates, refuse to provide coverage , or insert a restrictive exclusion, these
are muted punishments , at least as compared to requiring the perpetrator
to pay the punitive damages award directly.
Yet, as Hampton notes, retribution is not synonymous with
punishment. 42 Wrongs are made right in other ways as wel l . Public
ceremonies, apologies , and financial payments all help to reassert the
value of the person wronged relative to the person who committed the
wrong . Indeed, whether or not a punitive damages award is insured , that
award makes a public statement about the value of the victim that
contradicts the private assessment of the perpetrator at the time the wrong
was committed . Moreover, insured or not, a punitive damages award
represents a consequence for extreme culpable behavior that goes beyond
that for less culpable behavior . Although an insured punitive damages
award clearly will hurt less than an uninsured one , it nevertheless does
hurt: insurance is made more expensive and less available in the future;
for commercial entities there is a loss of good will; and for any
individuals involved, there are negative social consequences . 43

40.

See Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of

41.

See id.

42 .
43 .

In the context of groups or subcultures opposed to t'1e prevailing legal regime,

Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 165 9, 1 6 63 & 1691 ( 1 992).

See id. at 1685, 1695 .

the social consequences of a punitive damages award may not be negative.

I
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With that said, one cannot escape the fact that insurance for punitive
damages would allow a perpetrator, in return for a fee paid in advance,
to escape a significant part of the consequences for extreme , culpable
behavior. Thus , even though the punitive damages award may reassert
publicly the value of the victim, the fact that the perpetrator would not be
the one who pays that award would at least partially defeat the "poetic
justice " that Galanter, Luban and Hampton regard as one of the most
attractive features of punitive damages . 44 Indeed , in the Grimshaw case
described by these scholars , 45 were we to learn that the jury ' s award was
to have been paid, not by Ford, but rather by Aetna, Travelers , or
Lloyd's , we might wonder whether a significant part of the jury ' s
message might be lost o n Ford (much a s Galanter, Luban and Hampton
wondered what message Ford received when the judge reduced the jury's
punitive damages award by ninety-seven percent) .
E.

Summary

The analysis thus far can be summed up as follows: the theoretical
justifications for punitive damages are to prevent harm and to provide
retribution for highly culpable harm. Insurance for punitive damages
undercuts the prevention justification when it reduces the financial impact
of those damages on defendants (and potential defendants) who are
unlikely to respond adequately to the norm proj ection aspects of tort law .
Moreover, insurance for punitive damages undercuts the retribution
justification when it allows a perpetrator to escape responsibility for the
consequences of egregious action. At the same time , however, by
encouraging victims to seek and collect punitive damages , insurance for
punitive damages enhances tort law's capacity to proj ect norms and to
reassert publicly the value of those injured.
The lower the level of intent required for punitive damages , the
weaker the theoretical objections to insurance for those damages . Thus,
insurance for vicarious punitive damages does not seriously undercut the
prevention justification, because vicarious damages are assessed against
defendants who are no less likely to respond adequately to the norm
proj ection aspect of tort law than defendants subjected simply to
compensatory damages awards . Similarly , because vicariously liable
44.
See Galanter & Luban, supra note 10, at 1440 ("High punitive damages
awards hit homo economicus where it hurts: an eye for an eye , a tooth for a tooth , and
a bottom line for a b o ttom line. It is poetic justice."); Hampton, supra note 40, at 168889.

45.
See Grimshaw v. l:;ord Motor Co., 174 CaL Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 198 1) (an
appeal case where jur; awarded $125 million to a boy who was badly burned in an
explosion of a Ford Pinto).
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defendai1ts are significantly less morally culpable than defendants
subjected to direct punitive damages awards , insurance for v icarious
punitive damages is less obj ectionable from a retribution perspective.
Indeed , distinguishing between the insurability of direct and v icarious
damages should facilitate the calibration of the " sting " of those damages
to the culpability of the defendant .
III .

OBSERV ATIONS ON THE INSURANCE FOR PUNIT IVE D AM AGES THAT
IS ACTUALLY AVAIL ABLE ON THE

U.S.

INSURANCE M ARKET

The preceding discussion has addressed the relationship between
insurance and punitive damages from a simple (perhaps simplistic)
theoretical perspective in which insurance is an all or nothing
phenomenon.
The insurance for punitive damages that is actually
provided through the insurance market is more complex. This part of the
Article will describe important aspects of the insurance that is actually
available in order to lay the groundwork for considering whether
insurance-in-action presents the theoretical problems addressed in the
discussion above .
In the insurance field , the starting point for analyzing what insurance
is provided in any insurance transaction is the insurance policy form used
in that transaction . 46 Typically, that form is a standard form insurance
policy drafted by an insurance trade association. Even when an insurance
company chooses to use a form other than the industry standard, it would
be unusual for that form to differ from the industry standard other than
in detail .
As a result of this standardization , we can learn a great deal about
the nature of the insurance that is actually available on the insurance
market without undertaking an exhaustive market survey . Indeed, we can
go a long way toward understanding what punitive damages insurance is
actually available by focusing on the standard form policies used for the
two types of liability insurance which comprise the vast bulk of what is
sold in the United States : automobile liability insurance and general
liability insurance . 47 Whether the policyholder is John Doe , Cafe
46 .
I start with the form , not because of a theoretical positiOn that the
interpretation of fo rm contracts should start with the form, but rather because insurance
practitioners do . See Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship : Sales Stories,
Claims Stories, and Insurance Contra ct Damages, 72 TEX . L. REV . 1 395 , 1 4 09 ( 1 994)
[hereinafter Bakei, Stories] .
47 .
This Article will differ from what I understand to be insurance industry
custom by including wit.'l in the category of "general liability insurance " the liability

insurance that is sold as part of residential insurance packages , such as homeowners ,
renters , condominium, 2.nd dwelling insur2.nce . I do this because liability insurance in
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Juanita, or Mega Chemical Company, the basic provisions of the
applicable automobile and general liability insurance policy forms will be
remarkably similar, particularly as regards insurance for punitive damages
claims .
The central promise of the standard automobile and general liability
insurance policies appears in what is called the " Insuring Agreement" of
the policies. In general liability insurance policies , that promise is to pay
" those sums the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages
because of bodily inj ury , personal injury , or property damage . " 48 In
automobile liability insurance policies, that promise is to pay " all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages by
reason of bodily injury [or property damage] . . . sustained by any
person, caused by accident. "49
In both of these insuring agreements , the company promises to pay
those sums " the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as
damages." The agreements do not distinguish among kinds of damages .
Nor are there distinctions among kinds of damages elsewhere in the
standard primary automobile and general liability forms used by most
U . S . insurance companies . 50 Indeed , there is little dispute that, on their
face, most primary general and automobile policies provide coverage for
punitive damages . 5 1

these p ackages provides the same kind of broad form protection-using much o f the same
policy language-as the popular Commercial General Liability insurance form .

48.

See, e . g . , 1 SUSAN 1 . MILLER & PHILIP LEFEBVRE, MILLER'S STANDARD

INSURANCE POLICIES ANNOTATED 409 ( 1 996) . In the noncommercial, individual market,
the primary bodily injury and property damage coverage is provided as part of the
residential insurance package (i.e. , homeowners, renters, condominium or dwelling
insurance) and the primary personal injury coverage is provided by an umbrella insurance
policy.

49 .
1 995).
50.

See, e.g. , ISO, H03 and ISO personal umbrella forms.
IRVIN E. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LiABILITY INSURANCE § 23 . 0 1 (3d ed.
"Primary" insurance i s the first layer of insurance that covers a risk.

"Excess" or "umbrella" insurance provides coverage once the primary insurance is
exhausted (although in certain circumstances an umbrella policy may be primary).

As

discussed below, it is my working assumption that punitive damages exclusions are more
common in umbrella and excess insurance policies.

51.

But see Widiss, supra note 1 , at 475 (collecting cases stating that the

insurance policy is ambiguous

on

this point).

The ambiguity doctrine (by which

ambiguous policy provisions are interpreted to favor the policyholder) means that it makes

no practical difference whether we conclude that t_.>je standard form policy unambiguously
provides coverage for punitive damages

or

that the policy is ambiguous on this point. The

"as damages" litigation in the enviro nrnemal context makes clear that courts take a very
expansive interpretation of the meaning of the word "damages" in liability insurance
policies. See, e. g . , AIU Ins . Co. v. Superior Court, 799 P .2d 1253 ( 1 990).
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Nevertheless , the insurance that is actually available for punitive
damages is far from unlimited. Insurance companies limit the coverage
provided for punitive damages by using the following four tools:
(1) Underwriting practices intended to avoid providing
coverage for some targets of punitive damages claims;
(2) Insurance policies with dollar limits that are less than the
amount of a likely punitive damages judgment;
(3) Contract provisions intended to eliminate coverage for
claims that are likely to result in punitive damage awards;
and
(4) Public policy based refusals to fulfill the promise to pay
punitive damages claims .
Of course, these are in addition to the option of including an explicit
punitive damages exclusion in the liability insurance policy . The sections
that follow describe each of these tools.
A.

Underwriting

Insurance underwriting is the process of deciding how much
insurance to provide to whom, against what risks , and at what price . At
least since the eighteenth century , one aim of underwriters has been to
exclude from the insurance pool those members of a given rate class
whose loss experience is expected to exceed that of the average for the
class or, alternatively, to charge these higher risk individuals a higher
premium (which, in effect, is to create a new rate class) .
In identifying which potential insureds to exclude from the insurance
pool on this basis , underwriters have been guided by the concept of moral
hazard . As I have described in detail elsewhere, the insurance concept of
moral hazard is similar to the concept of moral hazard developed by
economists . 52 But while economists understand moral hazard to be a
property of institutional arrangements for the sharing of risk, insurance
underwriters understand moral hazard also to be part of the character of
the individuals or entities that participate in insurance arrangements .
In insurance practice, the differing loss experience of insureds within
a given rate class is understood to be attributable, in significant part, to

52.

See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy oflvloral Hazard, 75 TEX . L. REV . 237
Baker, Genealogy] .

( 1 996) [hereinafter
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vanat1ons in this second, " individual , " sense of moral hazard.53
Although it can be difficult to determine what exactly is meant by an
individual' s moral hazard, there are least two components that are
relevant to punitive damages : (1) the propensity to take care (or not) to
avoid harm to the person and possessions of oneself and others , and (2)
the degree of attachment to other conventional social norms.54 Implicit
in this understanding of moral hazard is the belief that, all other things
being equal , people who are careful and who observe other conventional
social norms are less likely to be the subject of punitive damages awards
than those who are not careful or do not observe such norms .
As with many other aspects of insurance practice, we can understand
insurance underwriting as an attempt to control the incentives created by
insurance . 55
Insurance underwriting attempts to control insurance
incentives by addressing the moral hazard of insurance applicants .
Although I am sometimes skeptical of insurance underwriters ' ability to
identify and exclude insureds on the basis of moral hazard, 56 whatever
success they do enjoy in this regard will decrease the punitive damages
exposure of their employers.
In this context, we can understand insurance underwriting as an
attempt to exclude from the insurance pool people who are (1) less likely
to be guided by the norm projection aspects of tort law ; (2) more likely
to respond to the incentives created by underenforcement, externalities or
insurance ; and (3) more likely to cause harm with the culpability
deserving of retribution.
As this description suggests , efforts by
insurance companies to reduce or control the moral hazard of insurance
will also tend to ameliorate the retribution and prevention objections to
insurance for punitive damages .
One example of the effect that insurance underwriting can have on
the actual insurance that is available for punitive damages comes from
automobile liability insurance. Perhaps the most common punitive
damages automobile accident case is that of the wrongful death caused by
a drunk driver . According to plaintiffs' lawyers , it is not unusual for

53.

See id.

54.

Insurance writers sometimes refer to moral hazard as a tendency toward fraud

or destruction, but, g iven that honesty and avoidance of harm are conventional soc ial
norms, we can understand a tendency toward fraud or destruction as an example of a lack
of attachment to conventional social norms .

I use the word "conventional " so as not to

suggest that disho nesty , destructiveness, v iolence and the l ike are not social norms i n
certain times and place s .

55.

For an extensive study of insurance companies' efforts t o manage the

incentives created by insurance, see CAROL HEIMER, REACTIVE RISK AND R<�. T!Ol'IAL

ACTION

56.

( 1 985).

See Baker, Genealogy, sup ra note 52, at 2 3 8 .
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such drivers to have had a conviction for driving under the influence
(DUI) . 57
Insurance companies in the standard and preferred risk
automobile insurance markets routinely refuse to sell insurance policies
to people who have a DUI conviction. Those with a DUI conviction can
obtain insurance in the substandard market or, failing that, from the
residual automobile insurance pool . The policies sold in these other
markets , however, provide low dollar coverage-often as l ittle as $25 , 000
per accident or less-that is well below the expected liability for any
serious automobile accident. As a result, punitive damages insurance in
fact is not widely available to those drivers believed to be most likely to
be the subject of a punitive damages claim.

B. Dollar Limits on Insurance Coverage
As this automobile insurance example illustrates, dollar limits on
coverage also serve to limit insurance companies' exposure to punitive
damages claims , particularly for large punitive damages claims . Indeed,
in the personal and smal! business markets , insurance against large
punitive damages awards does not exist in any practical sense, because
individuals and small businesses rarely purchase insurance with the kinds
of limits that would be needed to cover multi-million dollar awards . 58
Of course, empirical research suggests that the far more common
punitive damages award is well under $ 1 00,000 .59 At least among the
business and professional classes in the United States, automobile and
general liability insurance coverage at that level is widely purchased .
Thus, the available insurance limits would be insufficient to pay punitive
damages only in the exceptionally egregious case-when the jury really
became angry at the defendant. This suggests that insurance policy limits
may function, in a very rough way , to ameliorate some of the prevention
and retribution-based concerns about insurance for punitive damages . If
the jury really wants to impose a million dollar punishment on an
individual or a small business defendant, there is a good chance that
award will exceed the available insurance limits .

57.

These observations were related in the interviews reported in Tom Baker,

Transforming Punishmenr into Compensation : in the Shadow of Punitive Damages , 1 99 8

WIS . L . REV . 2 1 1 [hereinafter Baker,

Transfonning] . Given the addictive nature of
alcoho l , this is hardly surprising, but I would welcome suggestions of w a y s t o test this

assertion.
58.
iawyers.
75

59.

This "working assumption" is based on interviews with personal injury

See id. (reporting interv iews).

See Stephen Daniels & 1 oanne Martin, A1yth and Reality in Punitive Damages ,

MINN . L. REV. 1 , 42 ( 1 990) .
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In the large commercial insurance market, substantial policy limits
are far more common . Indeed , in commercial liability insurance cases in
which I have participated, annual limits well into the hundreds of millions
of dollars are not unusual. 60 This suggests that, except in the mass tort
situation, dollar limits alone do not effectively l imit the punitive damages
insurance coverage available to corporate America.
Nevertheless , as discussed below , I have a working assumption that
punitive damages exclusions are more common in umbrella and excess
policies. To the degree this is so, the dollar limits on primary insurance
coverage would tend to limit the punitive damages coverage for the large
corporate market in much the same way as insurance purchasing patterns
limit the punitive damages coverage in the personal and small business
markets .

C. Contract Provisions
Although insurance underwriting and dollar limits on insurance
policies do restrict insurance for punitive damages in a manner that
answers some of the theoretical obj ections to such insurance, these two
aspects of insurance practice are hardly a complete answer to those
objections . If there is to be a real answer-and I believe there is,
especially for the prevention-based obj ections-it has to come from the
insurance contract .
There are three types of contract provisions that reduce the insurance
coverage that would otherwise be provided for punitive damages claims
under standard liability insurance policies: intentional harm exclusions ,
punitive damages exclusions , and claim-specific exclusions .
The
paragraphs that follow describe each of these .
1 . INTENTIONAL HARM EXCLUSIONS

Standard general liability insurance forms exclude coverage for
bodily injury and property damage that is "expected or intended from the
"
The requirement in the standard
standpoint of the insured . 61
automobile liability policy that the injury or damage be "caused by
accident" serves a similar function . 62 Courts differ on the precise
meaning given to these words , but the common idea is the elimination of
liability insurance coverage in situations in which the insured knew or

60 .

See, e . g . , Armstrong World Indus . , Inc . v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. C o . , 26 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 3 5 (Ct. App . 1 995) (the consolidated asbestos insurance coverage cases).

MILLER

& LEFEBVRE , supra note 4 8 , at 409 .

61.

See, e . g . ,

62 .

See SCHERMER, supra note 49, § 23 .02 .
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should have known to a very high probability that harm would result. 63
Insurance companies have long included such exclusions in their policies
because of concerns about moral hazard, in both the "situational" and
"individual" senses of that term. 64
Insurance for intentional harm raises serious situational moral hazard
concerns . 65 As discussed in the context of the prevention obj ections to
insurance for punitive damages , there is good reason to believe that
insurance for intentional harm poses a clearer insurance-deterrence
tradeoff than insurance for inadvertent harm. Although certainly not all
actors can or will act in the manner predicted by the theory of moral
hazard, the insurance industry has made a collective decision not to
provide insurance for intentional harm, except for certain narrow or
specialized forms of coverage . 66 Thus, insurance is actually available
for punitive (and , for that matter , compensatory) damages only in cases
in which the defendant has not been shown to have intended the harm.

See ROBERT H. JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 86 1 -63 (2d ed .
63 .
1 996).
See HEIMER, supra note 5 5 .
64 .
What I refer to as "situational" moral hazard is that aspect of the insurance
65 .
trade's concept of moral hazard that coincides with the concept as it is used in economic
theory : the effect on incentives whenever one person bears the costs of harm caused by
another. In such a situation, the person causing the harm has less incentive to avoid that
harm than if (all other things being equal) she bore the full costs of that harm herself. See
Baker, Genealogy , supra note 52, at 2 3 8 .
66.
The insurance contract discussion in this paper i s limited to automobile
liability insurance and to the bodily injury and property damage coverage provided in
general liability insurance policies. There are other forms of insurance that provide
punitive damages insurance. The most significant of these other forms of insurance, in
terms of the numbers of policies in force, is known as "personal injury " coverage. This
cov erage is commonly included in commercial general liability insurance packages and
in umbrella insurance policies sold to individuals.
Personal injury cov erage often is provided w ithout an intentional injury exclusion,
especially at the primary level. See, e . g . , MILLER & LEFEBVRE, supra note 4 8 , at 4 1 2 .
Personal injury coverage is "named-p eril" insurance that, a s that characterization suggests,
provides coverage only against a number of specific kinds of claims (hence the term,
named perils).
Today, those claims include defamation, wrongful prosecution, and
trespass. See Terri D. Keville, Note, Advertising Injury Coverage: An Overview, 65 S .
CAL. L . REV. 9 1 9 , 928 ( 1 992).
Other forms of insurance that provide some coverage for punitive damages includes
directors and officers liability insurance, errors and omissions insurance (for lawyers,
accountants , and insurance agents) , and reinsurance (insurance for insurance companies).
I mention these forms of insurance only to make it clear that I am aware that the analysis
in this Article is directed at coverage for bodily injury and property damage and that there
may be forms of insurance coverage for which the market does not provide an adequate
answer to the theoretical obj ections to insurance for punitive damages.

i

j
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Insurance against intentional harm also raises individual moral hazard
concerns because such insurance will be disproportionately attractive to
those who are not constrained by conventional norms against causing
harm. If insurance for intentional harm were available, anyone who was
about to cause such harm would be well advised to buy that insurance .
Conversely, anyone who was reasonably sure she was not going to cause
harm intentionally would be well advised not to buy that insurance .
Because we are talking about intentional harm, people can identify in
advance (to a significant but not perfect degree) whether they will need
the insurance, and they can hide that fact from the insurance company (at
least the first time67) . Thus, insurance for intentional harm also presents
an adverse selection problem, 68 with the result that insurance that
excluded coverage for intentional harm would tend to drive out from the
market insurance that offered such coverage. 69
As a result of the intentional harm exclusion in liability insurance,
tort law in action addresses questions of fault, not only in a tort claim
filed by a plaintiff, but also in the presentation of that claim to the
defendant' s liability insurance company . In the tort claim, the formal
fault lines are two : between liability and no liability, and between
compensatory and punitive damages . The insurance claim adds a third
fault line-between intentional and unintentional harm.
The relationship between the punitive damages fault line and the
intentional harm fault l ine is not straightforward . Not all cases of
intentional harm will meet the appl icable tort law standard for punitive
damages,70 nor will all punitive damages cases meet the applicable
insurance law standard for intentional harm. The question of whether to
enforce contracts to provide punitive damages matters only for cases in
which the punitive damages standard is met, but the intentional harm
standard is not. 71

67 .

For a discussion of the repeat player, see infra text accompanying notes 75-

68.

Adverse selection refers to the tendency for insurance to be purchased by

76.
people who are disproportionately likely to experience an insured-against event.

See

Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets : An
Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q . J . Eco N . 629, 632 ( 1 976).

69.

See id. ; George A . Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons ": Quality Uncertainty

70 .

Of course, there h a s to b e some resulting bodily injury, personal injury , o r

and the Market Mechanism, 84

Q.J.

ECON . 4 8 8 ,

492-93 ( 1 970).

property damage for there to b e insurance coverage. F o r a listing of verbal formulations

& Koenig, supra note 30, at
1 3 1 7 n .240 .
71.
At least outside of Lhe specialized or narrowly targeted coverage discussed in

used b y courts as the punitive damages standard, see Rustad

supra note 66.
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2. PUNITIVE DAMAGES EXCLUSIONS

The most straightforward way to eliminate insurance coverage for
punitive damages is to include in the insurance policy a provision
explicitly excluding coverage for punitive damages . The fact that punitive
damages exclusions typically are not included in primary liability
insurance policies represents a considered choice to offer that coverage .
Indeed, efforts to include such exclusions in the industry-wide standard
form primary policies have been rejected on marketing grounds . 72 This
suggests that most insurance companies prefer to sel l , and most
policyholders prefer to buy , primary liability insurance policies that do
not contain a blan..J.;:et exclusion for punitive damages . This suggests , as
well, that intentional harm exclusions are an adequate solution to the
moral hazard and adverse selection problems that are posed by insurance
for punitive damages .
Nevertheless , it appears that punitive damages exclusions appear
more often in umbrella and excess liability insurance policies .73 If so,
this may reflect a judgment that, in an excess policy, a punitive damages
exclusion serves as a less expensive proxy for an intentional harm
exclusion . A very large punitive damages award is quite likely to reflect
the j ury ' s conclusion that the defendant consciously caused serious harm.
Nevertheless , an insurance company cannot avoid paying that claim,
based on an intentional harm exclusion, without a second trial . 74
A voiding coverage based on a punitive damages exclusion, in contrast,
would require no second trial .
3.

CLAIM-SPECIFIC EXCLUSIONS

Liability insurance policies also commonly contain claim-specific
exclusions that limit indirectly the insurance that is actually available for
punitive damages .
Contemporary standard form examples of such
exclusions include provisions relating to claims arising out of asbestos,
sexual harassment and molestation, assault, and pollution . These are all
liability claims that are disproportionately likely to arouse a strong sense
of moral indignation on the part of juries and, thus, pose a
disproportionate risk of punitive damages .
72 .

73 .

See

Widiss, supra note l , at 4 8 8 .
This woiking assumption is based on my

74.

Avoiding coverage on the basis of an intentionai harm exclusion requires a

in large commercial coverage cases .

involvement over the last nine years

factual finding that the insured committed r.h e relevant act

with the

requisite intent. Since

the standards for punitive damages and the intentional harm exclusion are not the same,
there will have 10

be

a.

second coverage tria l .
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Some insurance policies also contain claim-specific exclusions that
are specially drafted for the particular insureds to whom they apply.
These "manuscript" exclusions are inserted into general liability insurance
policies with some regularity once a product becomes the subject of mass
tort l itigation . Examples include exclusions relating to breast implants ,
IUDs and toxic shock syndrome .75
It seems unlikely that claim-specific exclusions are inserted in
liability insurance policies solely because of concerns about punitive
damages . But the exclusions do have the effect of reducing insurance
companies ' punitive damages exposure. More important, however, these
exclusions highlight the fact that insurance is an iterative game .
Insurers have strong incentives to eliminate the disproportionately
risky from their insurance pools. Thus, having insurance against claims
during one policy period is no guarantee that there will be insurance
against claims in the future . Indeed, this is becoming even more true as
the insurance industry shifts from "occurrence" to "claims made " forms
of coverage . 76 Consequent! y, regardless of the extent of the insurance
for punitive damages that initially is offered for sale on the insurance
market, the theoretical concern that punitive damages insurance would
allow an insured to avoid all the financial consequences of egregious
future action is unlikely to be borne out in practice for repeat players such
as manufacturers and retailers .

D. Public Policy Based Refusals

to

Pay

Insurance companies largely have chosen to l imit punitive damages
coverage indirectly, rather than by explicitly excluding coverage for
punitive damages . Notwithstanding the freedom of contract ideology that
still animates much of insurance practice, 77 liability insurance companies
regularly refuse to pay punitive damages claims on the grounds that public

75.
I am aware of these examples from discussions with lawyers involved in these
mass tort cases. We know that these manuscript exclusions exist because insurance
coverage for a product that becomes the subject of mass tort claims typically ends shortly
after the claims situation becomes acute, even though the manufacturer continues to have
general liability insurance .
76.
An occurrence policy is triggered by harm that takes place during the policy
period, regardless when the claim is made; a claims made policy is triggered when a
clairn is made during the policy period, provided that claim arises from harm that took
place after the "retroactive date" of the policy . See Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co. , 495 A.2d
406 ( 1 985). ClaitTIS made policies give insurance companies a greater ability to terminate
coverage when the number or type or size of claims becomes acute.
77 .
See Baker, Stories, supra note 46, at 1 40 8 , 1 4 1 7 ; cf Friedrich Kessler,
Contracts of A dhesion-Some 17wughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV.
629 ( 1 943).
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policy forbids it. 78 Today, about half of the U . S . jurisdictions are
receptive to this defense, at least with respect to direct (as opposed to
v icarious) punitive damages . 79 The merits of this defense are addressed
in Part IV of this Article.
Recalling my earlier claim that insurance companies have concluded
" that intentional harm exclusions are an adequate solution to the moral
hazard and adverse selection problems that are posed by insurance for
punitive damages , " 80 the careful reader may ask, "Why , then, do
insurance companies regularly refuse to pay punitive damages on grounds
of public policy? " After all , if an insurance company wants to pay a
punitive damages claim, there is no one with standing to sue who will
object: the insured gets the coverage and the victim gets the money .
Three possible explanations have occurred to me. The first follows
from the internal division in insurance companies between claims
departments and "production" departments (sales and marketing) . The
absence of an explicit punitive damages exclusion allows the production
departments to sell the "broadest coverage available, " while the public
policy against punitive damages insurance allows the claims department
to avoid paying those damages . One reason that claims and production
departments are separated bureaucratically in insurance companies is to
minimize the ability of producers to pressure those who pay claims and,
just as important, to permit the producers to say to their customers that
they have no control over whether a claim gets paid, thus helping to
1
preserve the personal relationship between producers and customers . 8
The second reason follows from the divided nature of the industry' s
decision not to include a punitive damages exclusion i n the commercial
l iability insurance policy . 82 Clearly , the dissenting companies did not
agree that offering punitive damages coverage was a good idea. The

78.
It takes some fam iliarity w ith insurance practice to fully appreciate the irony
of insurance companies relying on public policy arguments to avoid paying claims
otherwise covered by their insurance policies. The irony comes from the steadfast
complaints of insurance interests about judges who "rewrite" insurance policies to provide
coverage that the insurance companies did not sel l . According to that same logic, a judge
who refused to enforce an insurance company's promise to pay a punitive damages claim
would be "rewriting" the policy to take away coverage that the policyholder had bought.
As my prior writing makes clear, I do not agree that judges who refuse to enforce
standard form provisions are 1equiring insurance companies to provide insurance that they
did not sell, nor would I seriously assert that, when a manufacturer purchases a liability
policy covering risks in a state whose courts oppose such coverage, the manufacturer is
buying punitive damages coverage fo r those risks . See Baker, Stories, supra note 46.
See Widiss, sup1a note 1 , at 466-6 8 .
79.
Supra Part ill . C .2.
30 .

81.
82 .

See Baker, Stories, supra note 46, at 1 4 1 6 .
See Widiss, supra note 1 , at 4 8 8 .
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implied exclusion allows those companies to achieve at least part of their
goal of excluding punitive damages while still using the industry standard
form.83
The third reason is a game theoretic explanation. In the individual
instance , it is almost always in the insurance company ' s interest not to
pay a claim, provided it can do so without losing good wil l . The "public
policy" against punitive damages insurance allows the insurance company
to refuse to pay that part of the claim without appearing to exercise its
discretion in so doing and, therefore, without sacrificing good wil l .
Thus , even though offering the insurance may b e in the best interests o f
the industry a s a whole ( a fact suggested by the absence o f the exclusion
in the standard policy) , the contrary interests in the individual situations
overwhelm that collective interest. This is another instance of the familiar
prisoners ' dilemma, in which individually rational action leads to a
collectively irrational result. 84
Notwithstanding these explanations , interviews with personal injury
lawyers (both plaintiff and defense) suggest that insurance companies in
fact do pay punitive damages claims at the settlement stage even in states
in which they are not required to do so .85 Thus, the public policy
against insurance for punitive damages does not mean that there is no
punitive damages coverage, but rather that in an individual case insurance
companies have the power to decide whether to pay or not.
A rational insurance company will make that decision in a manner
that takes into account the s ize of the claim, the likelihood that the
customer will be lost, the profitability of the account, and, perhaps most
important, the size of the potential judgment it can avoid by paying some
punitive damages "tribute " at the settlement stage.86 In practice , this
means that some punitive damages coverage in fact is provided in the
settlement stageY

83.
One of the most important benefits of using the industry standard form is
gaining access to the collective loss experience of all insurance companies that use the
form.
84.
See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL . , GAME THEORY AND THE LAW, 48-49, 3 1 23 1 3 ( 1 994) (providing a game theoretic account of the prisoners' d ilemma). For a brief
history of the dilemma, see PARADOXES OF RATIONALITY AND COOPERATION 3-4
(Richmond Campbell & Lanning Sowden eds . , 1 985) .
85 .
See Balcer, Transforming, supra note 57 (interviews with personal injury
lawye rs p racticing in Florida, a jurisdiction that will not enforce contracts to insure
punitive damages). Note that the moneys paid are not denominated as punitive damages .
86.

See id.

87.

See id.
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E.

Summary

When we examine insurance practice, we find that the insurance that
is actually available on the insurance market is more restrictive than the
unlimited insurance considered in the theoretical discussion. Except for
specialized forms of coverage, insurance for intentional harm is not
available . The insurance for unintentional harm that is available excludes
some claims that pose a disproportionate risk of punitive damages .
Moreover, insurance underwriters regularly restrict, or refuse to provide,
coverage to insureds who pose a disproportionate risk of punitive
damages . All these restrictions follow from insurance companies ' efforts
to combat moral hazard and adverse selection .88 We also find that, even
in states in which punitive damages are formally uninsurable , insurance
companies regularly pay punitive damages claims at the settlement stage.
Thus, punitive damages insurance does not pose all the problems
suggested in the theoretical discussion, nor is prohibiting such insurance
the panacea that a purely theoretical or doctrinal approach might suggest .
Clearly, this description has not demonstrated that " in fact " these
market restrictions on insurance for punitive damages prevent that
insurance from undercutting the prevention and retribution obj ectives of
those damages . What it has demonstrated , however, is that insurance
companies have a strong financial incentive to construct the insurance
relationship in a manner that answers the theoretical objections to
insurance for punitive damages and that insurance companies underwrite
and draft insurance contracts in ways that appear to be consistent with that
incentive. The next part of this Article discusses whether, in l ight of this
incentive and those aspects of insurance practice, courts should
nevertheless refuse to enforce contracts to provide insurance for punitive
damages.
IV .

RECONSIDERING INSURANCE FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES

The prevention objection to insurance for punitive damages is an
instrumental one . It says that insurance for punitive damages should be
prohibited because that insurance will reduce the deterrent effect of those
damages . Yet, all insurance reduces the financial impact of the insured
against event, a fact that has not prevented widespread acceptance of
liability insurance. Thus, the prevention objection to insurance for
punitive damages must turn on a significant difference between the effect
of that insurance and the effect of insurance for compensatory damages .
38.

An additional dynamic, not explored in the tex1:, is the effort to define

insurance as a culturally acceptable practice.
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There has to be, in other words, some basis for concluding that insurance
for punitive damages undercuts tort law's prevention purpose more than
insurance for compensatory damages .
Part II argued that this basis can be found by comparing the moral
hazard and adverse selection problems posed by the two types of
insurance. In theory , insurance for punitive damages poses greater moral
hazard and adverse selection problems than insurance for compensatory
damages, because defendants who are subj ected to punitive damages
awards are more likely than other defendants to have known that their
conduct violated the applicable legal standard and to have predicted before
buying insurance that this would be the case.
Given their proven
willingness to violate legal standards , we can reasonably conclude that
these defendants are less able than other defendants to be governed by the
norm prevention aspect of tort law . Thus, punitive damages insurance is
obj ectionable from a prevention standpoint because it reduces the financial
incentive of tort damages for those who need that incentive the most.
From a prevention perspective, the policy choice between permitting
or prohibiting insurance for punitive damages comes down to a simple
question : can insurance companies be counted upon to make adequate
efforts to control the moral hazard and adverse selection problems posed
by such insurance? As Part III discussed, insurance companies have great
financial incentive to control the moral hazard of insurance, not only
because of the increased loss that results , but also because of the
accompanying problem of adverse selection . As a result, the insurance
that is actually available for punitive damages is far more restrictive than
what is assumed in the theoretical discussion . Indeed, when we look at
insurance practice , we find that the insurance contract already attempts to
eliminate insurance for those whom insurance companies have decided
most need the financial incentive of damages .
Insurance practice is far more protective of the prevention objectives
of tort law than the crude distinction in insurance law between
compensatory and punitive damages . Through the use of the intentional
harm exclusion, insurance practice regulates the prevention effect, not
only of punitive damages , but also of compensatory damages . Given the
incentive of insurance companies to control moral hazard and adverse
selection, and their ability to do so through the use of underwriting and
insurance contract provisions ,89 the best course for judges concerned

89.

For examples of other contract provisions used to control moral hazard, see

HEIMER, supra note 5 5 .

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

128

about punitive damages, insurance, and the prevention obj ectives of tort
law is to leave well enough alone . 90
With respect to the retribution obj ection to pumtlve damages,
insurance practice provides a less definitive response . The intentional
harm exclusion addresses part of the retribution obj ection. Indeed,
because the intentional harm exclusion applies to all damages, insurance
practice does a more thorough j ob in this respect than insurance law to
further the retributive purposes of tort law . Nevertheless, the goals of
insurance companies do not mesh as neatly with the retribution objectives
of tort law as they do with the prevention objectives of tort law .
Insurance companies seek to control moral hazard and adverse selection
because, speaking metaphorically, that puts money in their pockets .
Furthering the retribution objectives of the common law is less clearly in
their self interest. Indeed, provided that the problems of moral hazard
and adverse selection can be addressed, softening the retributive punch of
the common law would seem to be good business. Thus , the more
importance courts give to notions of retribution in developing their
approach to punitive damages , the stronger the obj ection to insurance for
punitive damages .
Nevertheless , once we acknowledge that the insurance market does
not, in most cases , offer coverage for intentional harm, the remaining
retribution objections to punitive damages insurance seem, from a
practical perspective, minor. While we do not have good data on the
frequency of punitive damages claims, there is a growing body of
research on punitive damages awards that shows that such awards are
rare91 and that they are often struck down on appeal . 92 If and when the
time comes to pay a punitive damages award, the insurance carrier is
almost certain to claim that the insured defendant intended the harm and ,
therefore , that there is no insurance for the claim. Although insurance
companies will not (and should not) win all those coverage cases , they
will win some , and many more will be settled for a percentage of the
amount claimed . The result is that even with insurance for punitive
90.
In light of my earlier writing, I should clarif"; that I am advocating a judicial
" hands-off' approach here because insurance companies' incentives and contracting
practices are consistent with the objectives of the legal system and because enforcing
contracts to provide punitive damages insurance is not inconsistent with insureds '
expectations. See Baker, Stories, supra note 46, at 1 420-22 (discussing how judges
construct the insurance relationship).
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damages, tort law in action calibrates the " sting " of a judgment according
to the culpability of the defendant to a far greater extent than is
acknowledged in the typical judicial decision prohibiting insurance for
punitive damages . 93
Moreover, as interviews with personal injury
lawyers suggest, efforts to improve the calibration of that sting by
prohibiting insurance for punitive damages will have less of an effect on
tort law in action than a judge or legislator might wish, because some
insurance for punitive damages in fact is provided even when such
insurance is prohibited. 94
V.

IMPLICATIONS FOR TORT AND INSURANCE POLICY

There are several conclusions that follow from the above discussion.
The first is that, from both a prevention and a retribution perspective , it
makes little practical difference whether punitive damages are insurable
or not. That does not mean, of course, that it might not make a great
difference to individual parties in individual cases . But there is little
reason to believe that prohibiting the insurance will have much effect on
social welfare. Any assertion that permitting the insurance will increase
loss by inhibiting the prevention aspect of tort law can easily be answered
by reference to the strong incentive for insurance companies to control
moral hazard and adverse selection and by the counter assertion that the
availability of the insurance will enhance the norm proj ection aspect of
tort law . Similarly , the intentional harm exclusion answers some of the
retribution objections to insurance for punitive damages . Moreover, in
some cases that do not involve intentional harm, the availability of the
insurance will increase the likelihood that plaintiffs will file actions ,
thereby enhancing tort law ' s ability to achieve its retributive ends .
The second conclusion follows from the first: if insurance for
punitive damages is not of great practical importance to the prevention or
retribution purposes of tort law , there must be some other explanation for
courts ' efforts to prohibit that insurance. One plausible explanation lies
in a combination of the legitimation function of courts and the dynamics
of the prisoners ' dilemma described at the conclusion of Part III (in which
the individually rational decision not to pay a particular punitive damages
claims overwhelms the collectively rational decision to offer such
coverage) . The prisoners ' dilemma explains why insurance companies
would repeatedly ask courts to refuse to enforce their promise , and the
legitimation function explains why courts sometimes grant this request.
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No judge likes the law to appear a fool , and the " sound bite" on punitive
damages insurance can easily make the law appear a fool .
My final conclusion is hardly unique to this paper. Indeed, it is the
common theme of much of the current insurance law scholarship : tort law
cannot be fully understood without paying close attention to insurance,
and insurance law cannot be understood without paying close attention to
tort law . 95 The clearest demonstration offered in this paper l ies in the
centrality of the intentional harm exclusion to the conclusion that
insurance for punitive damages does not significantly undercut the
prevention and retribution objectives of tort law .
The intentional harm exclusion exists to enable insurance companies
to make money by controlling moral hazard and adverse selection, but it
also furthers important prevention and retribution purposes of tort law .
As a result, the insurance company that denies a claim because of the
intentional harm exclusion furthers the prevention and retribution goals
of tort law nearly as much as the plaintiff who asserts the claim in the
first place . Thus , the intentional harm battle that dominates much
insurance coverage litigation has important consequences beyond the
resolution of that litigation. Indeed, no less than the plaintiff who brings
the claim, the insurance company that (properly) denies the claim on
intentional harm grounds acts on behalf of all victims and potential
victims of intentional harm to prevent loss and to achieve retribution .

95.

See, e. g . , KENNETH S . ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK ( 1 986); Chandler,

Understanding , supra note 4 ; Chandler, Visualizing , supra note 4 ; Syverud , supra note

29 .

